

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF AIR FORCE DOWNSIZING
A STRATEGY CONNECTION

by

Christopher A. Wyckoff, Lt Col, USAF

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Advisor: Dr. Kimberly A. Hudson

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
Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher A. Wyckoff is a U.S. Air Force personnel officer assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1993 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science with a German minor, Chapman University in 1998 with a Masters of Arts in Human Resource Management, and the Naval Postgraduate School in 2006 with a Masters of Arts in National Security Affairs, Homeland Defense. A career personnel officer, he has served at the wing, MAJCOM, and Forward Operating Agency level and is a graduated squadron commander.



Abstract

Two decades of downsizing and consolidations, has diminished the Air Force's ability to operate core missions (nuclear, logistics/maintenance, and personnel (38PX) are some core areas affected). As each year passes, new National Security Strategy (NSS) focus and turnover and changing expectations of personnel within the executive and Department of Defense (DoD), compounded the damage to Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) and missions. As career fields, specifically that of personnel, were consolidated, thinned out of its experts, corporate memory was reduced resulting in a lack of historical documentation of the downsizing programs, and the impact of the programs on overall force numbers and weapon systems. The institutional memory of cumulative damage done to career fields/AFSCs was unavailable to those answering subsequent rounds of reductions.



Introduction

The military is required to manage its force posture based on resources, threats, and objectives defined by the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS).¹ This guidance should provide “strategic coherence, which would contribute to financial solvency, public consensus, and, ultimately, international stability....”² Cold War strategic coherence made “force planning...relatively straightforward.”³ Post-Cold War force planning has been much more difficult, because threats and objectives identified in the national security and military strategies have expanded in type and scope: “The United States no longer confronted a clear adversary (the Soviet Union) or a rival ideology (communism). These threats had disciplined American strategic thinking. They had also become comfortable loadstars. Suddenly removed, they left policymakers adrift.”⁴

In the absence of post-cold war strategic consensus, the Air Force’s downsizing efforts have struggled to find coherence with ever-growing missions directed by the NSS. Instead of targeted downsizing to match missions, the Air Force maintains capabilities with fewer resources by making across-the-board reductions and consolidations in many AFSCs. These “peanut-butter spread” downsizing efforts have been repeated in multiple rounds of reductions from the early 1990s to the present.

Multiple rounds of downsizing and consolidation over two decades have diminished the Air Force’s ability to operate core missions such as nuclear, logistics/maintenance, and personnel. As career fields were consolidated, experts and institutional memory were reduced, and the impact of downsizing programs was not effectively documented. The institutional memory of cumulative damage to career fields/AFSCs was unavailable to those implementing subsequent rounds of reductions.

This paper will review and document the inconsistent relationship between resources (military expenditures as a percentage of GDP and military personnel numbers) and the expanding strategic direction within each NSS, NDS, and NMS over the past two decades (1991-2012). It will outline the force reduction programs of three presidencies (Bush, Clinton, Bush), document cumulative effects of Air Force reduction programs on AFSC 36XX-Personnel, and offer recommendations and conclusions.

Review of Strategic Documents⁵

Ideally, strategic documents should outline the threats and priorities for which Congress should allocate funds and the services should size their communities.⁶ “The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the President annually to submit an articulation of national grand strategy (NSS).”⁷ Each NSS shall provide “(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.”⁸ The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs then develop the NDS and NMS respectively. The NMS, developed or updated in even years based on the President’s most current NSS, provides the overall ends, ways and means to the NSS.⁹

The political and economic environment affects resourcing and implementation. “Changes in the environments of international and domestic politics have made continued downsizing the essential reality of contemporary military policy.”¹⁰ Over the past two decades, military spending as a percentage of GDP has declined. From a high of 5.6% at the beginning of President George H.W. Bush’s presidency in 1989 to a low of 3.0% in 2000 at the tail end of William J. Clinton’s presidency, the associated force structures of each service can be seen in comparison.




Figure 1. GDP in Relation to Force Levels

Force structure follows military expenditures as associated with GDP.¹¹ Army and Marine Corps Force levels from 1990 until the present followed the rise and fall in GDP. The Air Force and Navy do not have this predictability. From 2001-2002, the Air Force diverged from the expected pattern of resource allocation in times of war (increase budget) and has been in continued manpower decline for 20 years. This represents a significant issue as the DoD/AF budgets drop further with the conclusion of the commitment in Afghanistan. Unlike the Army or Marines, as resources become tighter, the Air Force will not have wartime increases from which to reduce. (see Figure 4-2¹²). In FY2001 the Army and Marines personnel levels were below projected FY2017 numbers. By 2017 they will have gained end strength, in comparison to 2001. In contrast, the Air Force and Navy will be reduced from 2001.

Figure 4-2. Active Military End Strength

End Strength	FY 2001	FY 2012 ¹	FY 2013 ²	FY 2017 Plan
Army	480,801	562,000	552,100	490,000
Navy	377,810	325,700	322,700	319,500
Marine Corps	172,934	202,100	197,300	182,100
Air Force	353,571	332,800	328,900	328,600
Total	1,385,116	1,422,600	1,401,000	1,320,200

Figure 2. Disparity between Active Duty End Strength (FY2001 and FY2017)

With this general understanding, a review of the specific force reduction actions in each presidency is required.

NSS/NMS Review under President George H.W. Bush January 20, 1989 – January 20, 1993

The George H.W. Bush administration established a new strategic direction: “A post-Cold War grand strategy could not rely on the obvious; instead, it had to define priority interests carefully, identify a hierarchy of threats, and nurture means for protecting interests and thwarting threats.” The NSSs and NMSs of the Bush years began a trajectory of expanding missions while cutting resources. The Bush administration published a NSS in 1990, 1991, and 1993 and a NMS in 1992.¹³ The strategy, “Regional Defense,” called for strengthening barriers against the reemergence of a global threat in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Latin America.¹⁴ The strategic effort focused on one superpower expanded to: ensuring no hegemon surfaced in any of four significant regions of the world; continued support of globalization; and the ability to reconstitute the force in the event of significant threat. Rather than “reducing pressure for U.S. military involvement in every potential regional or local conflict, the strategy as defined in the NSS and NMS, argue[d] not only for preserving [the current state of affairs] but expanding the most demanding American commitments and for resisting efforts by key allies to provide their own security.”¹⁵ An expansive, general, and vague strategy on a shrinking budget resulted in the services downsizing into a “Base Force.”

Force Reduction Program

The Base Force¹⁶ prescribed by the 1991 NSS called for “reduction in the total active force from 2.1 million to 1.6 million and in the reserve force from 1.56 million to 898,000. In terms of organization, the Army would be structured at 12 active and 8 reserve divisions, the Air

Force at 16 active and 12 reserve tactical fighter wings, the Navy at 450 ships including 12 carriers, and the Marines at 3 active and 1 reserve division.”¹⁷

In the context of these reductions, the services received little specific direction on “what relative weight different strategic themes” should be given and how “to balance planning for traditional contingencies with preparations for possible new problems (ranging from peacekeeping and limited intervention to dealing with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”¹⁸ This problem led to across-the-board reductions, versus targeted cuts to specific capabilities.

Result

The Base Force reductions (1991-1995) began a drastic personnel decline for the Air Force¹⁹. The Base Force Reductions spanned two presidencies (Bush/Clinton), and overlapped the Bottom Up Review (BUR) (1993-1999); the aggregate results will be discussed after the review of President Clinton’s reduction efforts.

NSS/NMS Review under President William Jefferson Clinton January 20, 1993 – January 20, 2001

President Clinton’s administration published a NSS in seven of eight years (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2001) and a NMS in 1995 and 1997.²⁰ Clinton’s strategic focus changed from regional defense to enlargement: “Throughout the Cold War we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement—enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”²¹ The difference between Regional Defense and Enlargement was significant and created further uncertainty. While there was some regional focus--the need to win two simultaneous major theater conflicts--enlarging the world’s community of democracies became paramount.²²

Additionally, Clinton removed the objective, ability to reconstitute the Armed Forces, and emphasized humanitarian and human rights operations.

Despite evidence that, “the military’s workload has risen significantly since the end of the Cold War and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) doesn’t anticipate a letup any time soon,”²³ the Clinton administration called for further reductions to the Armed Forces: Les Aspin’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) in 1993 called for a 22% reduction to the Armed Forces by 1999; and the QDR in 1997 called for another 6% reduction by 2003.

Force Reduction Programs²⁴

The BUR directed a reduction of active duty forces from 1,653,000 to 1,400,000 and reserves from 898,000 to 765,000. The Navy was hardest hit, dropping from 451 ships to 346 with personnel going from 509,700 to 394,000; the Air Force was next, with a loss of three wings and personnel dropping from 437,200 to 390,000; the Army lost two AD divisions and saw personnel drop from 535,500 to 495,000; the Marines gained personnel and ended at 174,000. The BUR “[set] the stage for increased operational tempo and rate of deployment even as force reductions continued. The U.S. military response to these ongoing challenges led to an increased commitment of Air Force aircraft to contingency operations.”²⁵ Making matters worse, “The report called for a substantially reduced force structure, but thus cut, the force could not meet its specified responsibilities...Aspin admitted that the budget ...wouldn’t cover even the scaled-down program proposed in his report.”²⁶ With the rise of undefined and diverse missions for the Air Force without clear direction or priority, the overall “force structure reductions fell unevenly across the force.”²⁷

The QDR’s purpose was to “conduct a comprehensive examination ...with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.”²⁸ It reduced Active manpower by 6.2 percent, reserve manpower

by 7.2 percent, and civilian manpower by 20 percent below 1997 levels, despite expanding threats and previous reductions.²⁹

it was clear that the US did not have the ability to deal with two near simultaneous major regional contingencies of the size the Bottom-Up Review postulated... Since that time, the mismatch between America's strategy and force plans, and the resources the US has available, has grown steadily... The end result is a growing but fundamental mismatch between US strategy, force plans, commitments, and defense budgets.³⁰

For the Air Force, the “1997 QDR sent mixed signals. The Revolution in Military Affairs [and the Clinton strategy of enlargement] obviously put greater reliance on airpower and space power, but it allocated the deepest force cuts to the Air Force.”³¹

Result

For the period of the Base Force Reductions (1994-1995), the BUR (1993-1999) and the 1997 QDR, each AFSC in the Air Force experienced some reduction to their base numbers of personnel.³² Reductions were managed independently without reviewing past reduction impacts. “The Base Force reductions, structures, and budgets might have worked, but the additional cuts piled on by Aspin, Clinton, and the Bottom-Up Review wiped out the possibility...It’s the cumulative impacts that will create problems.”³³

With increasing missions, and unable to divest itself of responsibilities, the Air Force consolidated career fields, rather than delete capability. Consolidation of career fields brought two or more previously unique disciplines/specializations under one AFSC, to ensure the viability of the career field and continue the service. When mergers occur, the officers within the new career field are responsible for leading all functional areas under the new organization (see Appendix 8).³⁴ Each consolidation has had similar results – combining diverse mission sets and responsibilities into a single functional community. I will concentrate on one example (the 36XX community) to illustrate the effects of two decades of downsizing and merger.

During the Bush and Clinton reduction years, the 36XX community went through four consolidations (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Personnel AFSC Initial Consolidation (1994-1997)

The union of these functional areas would result in a career field responsible for:

1. Civilian personnel operations: Labor relations, EEO, Hiring/Firing, Promotions
2. Military personnel operations: Casualty, Promotions, Reenlistment/Extensions, Readiness, Assignments, Professional Military Education/Testing, Retirement/Separations, Base Level Education
3. Administration: Reprographics, Postal Operations, Records Management, FOIA, Office automation, Orderly Room Support
4. Social Actions: Drug and Alcohol Abuse, Equal Opportunity/Human Relations³⁵

The scope of responsibility increases as career fields merge. In most cases very little work is actually lost or divested. The consolidation is accomplished to “have our forces transiting from "doing more with less" to "doing even more with even less.”³⁶ This concept goes against three best practices in industry: workforce reduction; work redesign (eliminating functions, products while consolidating and merging); and systemic (changing the organization culture).³⁷ Success comes from a combination:

[d]ownsizing generally accompanies some kind of restructuring and reorganizing, either as part of the downsizing plan or as a consequence of downsizing. Since companies frequently lose a significant amount of employees when downsizing, they usually must reallocate tasks and responsibilities. Consequently, downsizing often accompanies corporate calls for concentration on ‘core capabilities’ or ‘core businesses,’ which refers to the interest in focusing on the primary revenue-

generating aspects of a business. The jobs and responsibilities that are not considered part of the primary revenue-generating functions are the ones that are frequently downsized [and eliminated]³⁸

Maintaining the same amount of work [or more as missions increase] while reducing employees will lead to problems such as overload and burnout.³⁹

The Air Force downsizing did not entail a combination strategy. The Air Force reduced personnel and consolidated mission sets without reducing the work to be accomplished by, in this case, the 36XX officers. As a result, the initial round of reductions in the 1990s was the start of the slippery slope which in the end would decrease functional capability.

NSS/NMS Review under President George Walker Bush January 20, 2001 – January 20, 2009

The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 caused another change in strategic direction for the Armed Forces. The George Walker Bush administration published two NSSs (2002 and 2006), two NDSs (2005 and 2008) and one NMS (2004). A review of these documents⁴⁰ and the 2001 and 2006 QDRs will show compounding uncertainty in strategic mission that continues to impact the overall force structure for the Armed Forces.

Clinton's Enlargement strategy was replaced by a strategy to "Protect the Homeland" and capabilities based planning, which focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who or where an adversary might be.⁴¹ The requirement to fight and win 2 MTCs was replaced with the 1-4-2-1 concept.

1. Defend the homeland (the first "1" in the formulation)
4. Deter aggression in four critical theaters (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, Middle East/Southwest Asia).
2. Swiftly defeat aggression in any two theater conflicts at the same time.
1. Preserve the option for decisive victory in one of those theater conflicts, including the capability to occupy an aggressor's capital or replace his regime.⁴²

Championed in the 2005 NDS and 2004 NMS, 1-4-2-1 strategy for force management was “more demanding than the 1997 QDR requirement that the force be ready to handle two major theater wars; [this new strategy] would drive the size of the force. The new standard was also more reliant on airpower.”⁴³ Faced with another strategy and a different concept to identify resources and priorities (capabilities-based) and compounded by greater diversification of strategic objectives, the NSS, NDS, and NMS continued to downsize or transform the military: “Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate.”⁴⁴ Transformation, addressed in the QDR, downsized the Armed Forces again.

Force Reduction Program

The 2001 QDR directed very little change to the overall force structure numbers for the Armed Forces. As Cordesman and Frederiksen noted, the QDR “offered scant direction on how the services might prevent or respond to so-called fourth-generation warfare attacks like the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Moreover, it did little to describe major changes in US force structures.”⁴⁵ The 2006 QDR through Presidential Budgeting Directive (PBD)-720 “outlined the USAF’s plans to reduce the total active force by approximately 40,000 personnel as a means of financing aircraft recapitalization and modernization programs.”⁴⁶ As a result, “In 2007, the USAF undertook a reduction-in-force. Because of budget constraints, the USAF planned to reduce the service's size from 360,000 active duty personnel to 316,000.”⁴⁷ The size of the active-duty USAF in 2007 was roughly 64% of that in 1991.⁴⁸ However, the reduction was ended at approximately 330,000 [later defined to be 326,000] personnel in 2008.⁴⁹ While the Army and Marine force continued to grow, and the Navy remained flat, the Air Force

continued to downsize despite the fact that the new 1-4-2-1 strategy would be more reliant on airpower--a continuing disconnect between strategy and resource allocation.

Result

With continued reductions in USAF personnel despite increasing responsibilities, downsizing and consolidation continued. In 2006 and 2008 respectively, the 36XX community merged with the Manpower (38MX) and Services (34MX) communities into Manpower-Personnel (37FX). (see Figure 4 and Appendix 8), requiring an additional functional competency (Manpower) for the officers within the consolidated 37FX community.




Figure 4. Personnel AFSC Consolidation Historical (1994-2009)

The Manpower competency encompasses the manpower and organizational design expertise for the Air Force. The skillset required is deep and entails expertise in mathematics and operations research. According to the career field's occupational survey, the function is responsible for:

5. Manpower and Organization⁵⁰
 - a. Develop and maintain manpower standards

- b. Advise on and conduct productivity enhancement/continuous improvement studies
- c. Analyze organizational structures
- d. Develop grade and skill requirements
- e. Optimize manpower usage
- f. A-76 commercial activities
- g. Advises leaders in and designs and implements organization changes and structures
- h. Advises and assists on modern business practices
- i. Manages manpower for war-time readiness

Prior to consolidation, manpower officers were experts in organizational design, organizational change, and efficiency. After merging with personnel, the deep development of manpower competencies was significantly diminished as officers were now responsible for all facets of their merged function.

The final merger was with Services/MWR (34MX). Services/MWR was a broad function comprised of diverse skillsets, which supported entire base populations. Incorporating Services/MWR into the personnel function was considered and rejected during resource reductions in the late 1980s, as the Air Force sought efficiencies. The rationale for not merging the specialties was that the squadrons would have too many functions and personnel, making management difficult. (Emphasis added)⁵¹ In 2009, the Air Force reversed this decision despite even greater mission complexity, and Services/MWR merged with the Manpower-Personnel community to become Force Support (38F). The services community brought the following responsibilities:

- 6. Services⁵²
 - a. Food service (dining facilities, flight kitchens, and other food service facilities)
 - b. Transient housing (visiting quarters and temporary lodging facilities)
 - c. Mortuary affairs (search and recovery, inspection of human remains, briefing next of kin, military honors, honor guard management, and personal property program)
 - d. Recreation activities (fitness centers, recreation centers, outdoor recreation activities, and information ticket and tours)

- e. Libraries
- f. Business activities (golf courses, clubs, bowling centers, youth programs ([child development school age program and youth centers])
- g. Membership clubs (rod and gun, and aero)
- h. NAF Human Resource Office
- i. Protocol

The amount of work assigned to officers in the reduced communities rose. The breadth of skills required increased and the development and retention of deep knowledge and institutional history diminished with consecutive consolidations.

Observations

General Strategic Observations

- Frequent, expansive changes in guiding strategic documents do not provide adequate guidance for resource allocation and expectations for the armed forces. Similarly, these documents do not match the expanding nature of strategic expectations on the military with the manpower resource requirements of services who will be the primary executor of these growing missions. With the shift to Asia and the associated humanitarian and expeditionary nature of missions, Naval and Air assets will increasingly be needed; yet both services will be reduced to their lowest level.
- There must be a more comprehensive and direct look at objectives, threats and the capabilities needed by the elements of national power – specifically the military. The strategy should not change annually, and it should provide succinct strategic direction. There must be a clearly defined linkage between objectives, capabilities needed, and resources required to meet the strategic focus. The executive and legislative branches should clearly understand the ramifications of diminished resources to the Armed Forces structure when inversely proportional to the overall increase in strategic mission. Based on the review of the two decades and the continued actions by the Air Force, it is

apparent that despite changes in executives and strategies, the Air Force does not have the ability to stem the tide of reductions. Damage to career fields has been done. The question remains how to stop the slide.

- Consolidation was intended to safeguard capacity in functional communities in the early rounds of reductions because there was no clear focused direction or objective for specific forces contained within the strategic documents of the executive. Cost sharing reductions across all AFSCs was initially seen as safer to maintain capacity, because the national strategies, which should provide focused direction, did not. Two decades of downsizing, reductions, and consolidation destroyed capability versus preserving it. The services can not cope with working longer hours, doing more work with less and thinning out the rest of the force's expertise.
- Consolidation as a tactic to meet across the board reductions is not reserved just for functional communities. Bases are also subject to this tactic. BRAC and joint basing, tactics used by DoD to consolidate service resources in close proximity, was accomplished to save dollars in the fiscally constrained environment. Like the problems in the functional consolidations, both have had equal problems—the first because the BRAC bases are seldom really closed and the second because it has proven costly.

Air Force and Functional Observations

- Downsizing strategies did not place a significant focus on divesting work while consolidating in response to the reductions. Most efforts focused on strictly matching the number of personnel reductions to the dollars needed. This concept does not follow business practices for successful downsizing actions which incorporates reductions with divesting of work. The dictate, “do more with less,” drives inefficiencies. In many cases

the work is done and/or monitored by the new functional and a portion of the work is pushed to the AF community at large as a second and third order effect. Those functional communities, who were never the experts or assigned those responsibilities, now help bear the cost of the reduced capability of the owning functional area. This has and will continue to have detrimental effects as the reductions continue. As an example, commanders and their Airmen are responsible for being administration, personnel, finance, communications/computer efficient because the expertise in their units or base has been reduced, eliminated or consolidated. This impacts the time and resources these secondary AFSCs have to accomplish their own functional area work. In essence, while these communities have not been thinned out via their own functional consolidation, they are being thinned out as an ancillary effect of other consolidations. This impacts their own expertise and concentration on their mission.

- Officer development in consolidated career fields has been hampered. The once universal concept for officer development in a functional category was to concentrate on learning the details of the function (deep) and then, over the course of a career, generally as one became a field grade officer or senior CGO, development would turn to learning more about the Air Force and different functions and their operation (broad). While this still occurs in many functionals that have a singular mission set (Security Forces, Operations, Maintenance), those support functions that have been merged/consolidated over the years and now encompass many functional disciplines, the development is no longer deep to broad it is broad only. For these career fields and officers, their expertise of their own functional community is very shallow.

- 38MX was the organizational experts for all force structure change programs, organizational design and analysis as discussed in this paper. With the consolidation, the Air Force destroyed this competency by merging with 36PX (personnel) and 34MX (Services). With the dilution of career fields, the Air Force has removed the experts who conducted and advised change management activities in a time of diminished resources when those disciplines are needed most.

Opportunities for Additional Research

The research opened by this paper is just the tip of the problem. The results for the original 36XX and now 38PX career field as a byproduct of the downsizing tactic taken by the Air Force and the observations regarding the strategies employed by the executive can be extrapolated to almost every functional community in the Air Force and expanded to other services. It is critical now to review what really has been done to the military. Consolidation, doing more with less, and continually thinning out the career fields because there is no concentrated focus area to strategically reduce is not the answer, and in many cases, the damage may be irreversable unless a significant influx of resources occurs (which won't happen as we continually downsize and dollars are even more scarce) or the government changes coping mechanisms. These are the areas that require additional research.

- Issue: Other functional issues (Logistics, Finance, Contracting, Communications/computers, Nuclear enterprise, etc) similar to those represented in this paper
 - Reason: Consolidation of these functional communities created a similar dynamic as that for the 38PX. Reduction of expertise, thinning out of the career field

- Initial documentation: “The merger of SAC and TAC into ACC resulted in the reduction, consolidation, and elimination of training schools focused on the nuclear mission...When it was established in 1992, USSTRATCOM’s only mission was to implement national nuclear deterrence policy. However, as part of an ongoing initiative to reform and update the organizational structure of the Department of Defense, USSTRATCOM and U.S. Space Command merged in 2002. The rise in the importance of other global missions expanded USSTRATCOM’s missions. With this multiplicity of missions, USSTRATCOM’s leadership and staff did not have sufficient time or resources to maintain a singular focus on the nuclear mission...the nuclear enterprise suffered further inattention as a result of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process in 1995. The San Antonio Air Logistics Center (SA-ALC), which was the sole centralized Air Force nuclear sustainment center, was closed.”⁵³
- Issue: Second and third order effects to other functional areas (all career fields – Operations, Maintenance etc) as a result of the consolidated functionals loss of complete oversight to their functional area –ancillary thinning of other functional communities.
 - Reason: Consolidation of functional communities without loss of function or mission means that the functional members do more with less but also a cost share is pushed to other functionals to manage.
 - Initial documentation: “Air Force officials reestablished squadron commander support staffs on Oct. 1 to help commanders manage administrative duties and other personnel and knowledge operations functions. The decision to recreate squadron CSSs was made by Air Force senior leaders during a Corona South

conference in February to help squadron commanders who were overburdened by personnel, knowledge operations and administrative support workloads.”⁵⁴

- Issue: Joint basing effects as a result of consolidation efforts
 - Reason: Consolidation of like service support activities without losing capacity was supposed to save money.
 - Initial documentation: “The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not developed or implemented a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies. The Department of Defense (DOD) originally estimated saving \$2.3 billion from joint basing over 20 years, but in the absence of a plan to drive savings, that estimate has fallen by almost 90 percent.”⁵⁵

Recommendations

The Air Force has been downsizing for two decades in a context of increasing mission demands and diminishing resources. Increasing mission demands prevent the Air Force from making cuts in line with best practices such as workforce reduction and work redesign (elimination of work). Instead, the Air Force has attempted to do more with less, consolidating functions for its officers while keeping all the functional requirements. As a result, the Air Force has eliminated the experts it needs to conduct its change programs, organizational design, and manning.

In order to stop the Air Force’s slide, two recommendations need to be considered. First, the executive and legislative branches must provide clear and direct strategic guidance to DoD; expanding, vague strategic focus combined with legislative reduction in resources to meet these missions does not allow DoD to accurately determine what forces are needed and to prioritize missions. As a result of this inconsistency in mission versus resources, DoD spreads the

reductions across all career fields to ensure capacity. After two decades of this tactic, capacity has been diminished as career fields have been thinned and consolidated.

Next, if resources continue to diminish with expanding strategic focus, DoD and the Air Force should consider implementing a Revolution in Military SUPPORT Activities (RMSA). Should DoD keep clubs, auto hobby shops, fitness centers, golf courses etc. when the civilian sector offers the competition and at lower cost and better facilities? Is it necessary for DoD to have four separate finance, personnel, computer, civil engineering, contracting activities or so many diverse and separate PME institutions, Academies etc. in this era of joint operations and diminished resources? Arguments about service culture, unique missions, and practices are frequently cited as reasons not to purple or singularize support activities, and past attempts to purple some (Defense Integrated Human Resource Management System (DIHRMS) have failed horribly. Nevertheless, as strategic responsibilities will likely continue to expand while resources diminish, a RMSA will need to closely examine these issues.

Conclusion

This paper has documented the detrimental cumulative effects of multiple rounds of downsizing in an era of expanding strategic scope and declining resources. In part due to insufficient documentation of downsizing's effects, USAF has consistently overestimated the potential benefits of cutting current forces, and has not demonstrated a consistent capacity to estimate the level of future capabilities it can afford through cutting current forces.

Doing more, keeping the same capabilities while downsizing, and thinning career fields through consolidation might have worked for the initial reductions, but after two decades, this technique has hollowed various career fields, removed expertise and pushed the workload onto other functional communities that have also been hit with reductions. We may be past the point

of correction without substantial additional resources or a significant change in operations and organizational culture. Adding another mission area for forces that are already thinned, without clear strategic prioritization and adequate resourcing will further exacerbate the problems.



Appendix 1 – NSS Review (1989-1993)⁵⁶

Year	President	NSS	NDS	NMS	NSS Context	NSS Objectives	NSS Defense Agenda	NSS Defense Direction	NSS Assessment
1993	George H. W. Bush	YES			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. US and world has entered a new era 2. Democracy is spreading and Soviet threat and nuclear annihilation is significantly diminished 3. The world needs the leadership of the US - global leadership 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Politically, ensure emerging/emerged democracies are successful 2. Economically, protecting and broadening open markets 3. Militarily, global security is threatened by regional instability 4. Unprecedented opportunity to promote our interests rather than defend them due to peace dividend 5. Global engagement and leadership 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional defense strategy - reduction by almost a quarter 2. Proliferation, terrorism and drug trade still threaten stability 3. Strategic deterrence and defense 4. Forward presence 5. Crisis response 6. Reconstitution 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reemphasis of 1/4 reduction and need to maintain alliances, high quality personnel, and technological superiority 2. Much the same as 1991 3. National defense budget will continue to decline - industrial base and ability to reconstitute needs to remain viable 4. Non proliferation, arms control, BMD, Intelligence, terrorism, combatting illegal drugs remain important themes 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Overall, very similar to 1991 - it just reemphasized all the same themes 2. Continued emphasis on 25% reduction and decreased budget 3. The list of threats remained expansive with ability to surge
1992	George H. W. Bush			YES					
1991	George H. W. Bush	YES			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New end of Cold War strategy 2. How to keep direction and allies moving forward without the common tie of Soviet threat 3. World too interdependent - can not turn inwards 4. Cannot be the world's policeman but must continue to assist 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.. Survival of US as free and independent state <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Deter aggression to security to US and Allies B. Counter threats to the security to US - including International terrorism C. Improve stability through arms control, modernizing, developing systems to defend against ballistic missile strikes D. Promote democratic change in Soviet Union E. Foster restraint of global military spending and military adventurism F. Prevent transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources G. Reduce flow of illegal drugs 2. Healthy growing US economy <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Promote strong US economy B. Ensure access to foreign markets C. Promote open and expanding international economic system D. Achieve cooperative international solutions to environmental challenges 3. Build and sustain relationships <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Strengthen and enlarge commonwealth of free states B. Establish more balanced global partnership of responsibilities C. Strengthen international institutions D. Support western Europe's march to greater economic and political unity E. Work with North Atlantic allies to develop CSCE 4. Stable and secure world, where political and economic freedoms, human rights and democratic institutions flourish <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Maintain stable regional military balances B. Promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes C. Promote growth of free, democratic political institutions D. Aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions E. Support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Smaller regional contingencies 2. Need to reconstitute forces 3. New defense strategy based on fiscal requirements and global responsibilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ensure strategic deterrence (nuclear deterrence) - Exercise forward presence in key areas - Respond to crises (smaller force, oriented to short warning, regional contingencies - move from large reserve/guard to mostly active component)(smaller force, oriented to short warning, regional contingencies - move from large reserve/guard to mostly active component) - Retain national capability to reconstitute forces 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 25% smaller force 2. "The Base Force" - minimally acceptable level " 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very expansive - it covered the entire world and while stipulating the need to move to regional contingencies it still left global war open as a possibility with the need to reconstitute in 1-2 years to meet that threat. 2. 25% reduction to create the Base Force was to be the very minimum - specifying that and reduction below this level was not prudent 3. Overall threats were world wide with need to continue major nuclear deterrence and defense

Appendix 2 – NMS Review and Resulting Force Reductions (1989-1993)⁵⁷

Year	President	NSS	NDS	NMS	NDS Direction	NMS Foundations	NMS Strategic Principles	NMS Assessment	Reduction Review	By Date	% Reduction
1993	George H. W. Bush	YES									
1992	George H. W. Bush			YES		1. Strategic Deterrence and Defense 2. Forward Presence 3. Crisis Response 4. Reconstitution	1. Readiness 2. Collective Security 3. Arms Control 4. Maritime and Aerospace Superiority 5. Strategic Agility 6. Power projections 7. Technological 8. Superiority 9. Decisive Force	1. Coincides directly with NSS 2. Defines military objective and directs Base Force with associated reduced posture defined 3. Relies on ability to reconstitute if needed 4. Relies on the ability to continue to modernize (R&D, technological innovation, and pipeline for superior systems)	Base Force	1997	25%
1991	George H. W. Bush	YES									

Year	President	Reduction Review	By Date	% Reduction	New Base (AD Army)	New Base (AD Navy)	New Base (AD Air Force)	New Base (AD Marine)	Total AD	Total Reserve	Army AD Divs	Army Res Divs	AF AD Wings	AF Res Wings	Navy ships	Navy carriers
1993	George H. W. Bush															
1992	George H. W. Bush	Base Force	1997	25%	535,500	509,700	437,200	170,600	1,653,000	898,000	12	8	15	11	451	12
1991	George H. W. Bush				760,000	587,000	524,989	197,000	2,100,000	1,560,000	18	10	24	12	546	15

Appendix 3 – NSS Review (1994-2001)⁵⁸

Year	President	NSS	NDS	NMS	NSS Context	NSS Objectives	NSS Defense Agenda	NSS Defense Direction	NSS Assessment
2001	Bill Clinton	YES			Overall - similar to 2000 - it adds to the transformation portion by outlining the need to transform for asymmetric conflicts as well as, 6 other areas (service concept development and experimentation, joint concept development/experimentation, robust processes to implement changes in the services/joint community, focused science/technology efforts, international transformation activities, new approaches to personnel				
2000	Bill Clinton	YES			1. Third tenant changed to "Promote democracy and HUMAN RIGHTS abroad" 2. Military spending increase of \$112B in 2000-2005 (first time in a decade) 3. Turned corner on readiness, problems still exist in critical skills and recruiting 4. Rest is similar to 1998	Similar to 1998	1. Similar with some additions (maintaining space and information superiority) 2. 2 MTCs still a requirement 3. Added "transformation" of military and Defense Reform Initiatives	1. DRI will free up resources 2. Transformation is critical 3. Competitive sourcing, acquisition reform, transformation of logistics, elimination of excess infrastructure through two additional BRAC rounds	1. While it states there will be a plus up of dollars for military it also discusses extensive DRI and transformation
1999	Bill Clinton								
1998	Bill Clinton	YES			Similar to 1997 NSS	1. Addresses for the first time "globalization" as a challenge 2. Prepared to act alone when it is most advantageous - but many security issues are best achieved in concert with allies 3. New security issue - spread of dangerous technologies, foreign intelligence collection, protecting CI	1. Fighting and winning major theater war - in 2 theaters - similar words from previous NSS 2. Discusses QDR - modest reductions in personnel to support positions 3. Foster innovative approaches, capabilities, technologies, and organizational structures 4. BRAC announcement	1. Further reduction in the force	Similar to last - reduce the force through various means yet the threat and expectations continue to grow in complexity and challenge
1997	Bill Clinton	YES		YES	1. NSS for a new century - first NSS of second term 2. Still advocated the same basic 3 - nuclear proliferation concern is also still present 3. International community is often reluctant to act forcefully without US leadership	1. In addition - foster peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe 2. Look across the Atlantic for economic partnership 3. America must prosper in the global economy 4. America must continue to be unrelenting force for peace 5. Must move strongly to counter growing dangers to security 6. Must have diplomatic and military tools to meet all challenges	1. Similar to previous NSS in terms of threats 2. Also states - Not only must the US military be prepared to successfully conduct multiple concurrent operations world-wide, it must also be prepared to do so in the face of challenges such as terrorism, information operations, and threats of WMD 3. Acting alone if need be but preference is for multilateral action 4. High end is fighting and winning major theater wars 5. Able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross border aggression in two distinct theaters in overlapping time frames	1. Continue aggressive efforts to construct appropriate 21st century national security programs and structures 2. QDR is doing this within the DoD 3. Modernization is approaching quickly and must be done 4. R&D investment is needed	1. Similar in scope and direction 2. Interesting - says the challenges are increasing yet QDR directs reduction 3. The budget seems to have won out over challenges
1996	Bill Clinton	YES			Same or almost the exact same as the NSS from 1994 and 1995 - update to the specifics that occurred in the year, revised how and when military forces will be used		Similar to previous Clinton NSS statements	1. Revised how/when US will engage 2. Vital American interests - survival, security, and vitality of our national entity - defense of US territory, citizens, allies, economic well being 3. Not vital US interests - affect importantly our national wellbeing but only carefully and if they advance US interests 4. Humanitarian interests	1. Detailed explanation on how, when to use and decide to use force 2. More narrowed down use of force situations from previous NSS
1995	Bill Clinton	YES		YES	Same or almost the exact same as the NSS from 1994				
1994	Bill Clinton	YES			1. End of Cold War changed security imperatives 2. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose regional threats 3. Proliferation of WMD is a major challenge 4. Large scale environmental degradation is an issue 5. Global economy 6. Engagement and enlargement	1. Credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight 2. Bolster US economic revitalization 3. Promote democracy abroad	1. Dealing with major regional contingencies 2. Providing credible overseas presence 3. Countering WMD 4. Contributing to multilateral peace operations 5. Supporting counterterrorism efforts 6. Promoting and engaging in peace operations from multilateral perspective	1. National interests will dictate the pace and extent of our engagement 2. Seek to help our allies or the relevant multilateral institution 3. In every case - consider critical questions before committing military force - have we taken all nonmilitary options available 4. Engagement must meet reasonable cost and feasibility thresholds - multilateralism and diplomacy 5. Strategic deterrence, arms control, intelligence, environment	1. First time actual criteria for use of force was provided 2. Reduced language for use of force - despite acknowledgement to the similar threats 3. Removed language for the ability to reconstitute the force 4. All this opens up the ability to further reduce the military 5. Continued emphasis on strategic nuclear forces - "continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability..."

Appendix 4 – NMS Review and Resulting Force Reductions (1994-2001)⁵⁹

Year	President	NSS	NDS	NMS	NDS Direction	NMS Foundations	NMS Strategic Principles	NMS Assessment	Reduction Review	By Date	% Reduction
2001	Bill Clinton	YES							QDR		
2000	Bill Clinton	YES									
1999	Bill Clinton										
1998	Bill Clinton	YES									
1997	Bill Clinton	YES		YES		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional dangers: Iran, Iraq, North Korea 2. Asymmetric challenges: state and nonstate actors to include terrorists that might possess WMD 3. Transnational Dangers: extremism, ethnic and religious disputes, crime, refugee flow 4. Wild cards: unexpected world/technology events 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Shape 2. Respond 3. Prepare now 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Specifically identified asymmetric and wild card threats 2. Strongly made the case for why the military needed to be involved with shaping the international environment 3. ID's force structure in great detail to perform strategy 4. ID need for joint force 	QDR - Full Spectrum Force	2003	6%
1996	Bill Clinton	YES				Military conducted Nuclear Posture Review per the NSS					
1995	Bill Clinton	YES		YES		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Flexibility and selective engagement 2. Based on NSS and BUR 3. Promote Stability 4. Thwart Aggression 5. Threats- Regional instability- WMD- Transnational dangersDangers to democracy and reforms 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Peacetime Engagement 2. Deterrence and conflict prevention 3. Fight and win - 2 major regional contingencies - simultaneously 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Removed reconstitution but added a more engagement focused mission - peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and national assistance 2. Arguably more diverse and in need of larger force with 2 MRCs versus the need to reconstitute 3. Each of the 3 components contains subsets that are discussed in previous NMS and also includes others such as jointness and 2 MRC 4. Emphasizes the BUR and the 8th year of the drawdown 5. Identifies in detail the reductions to be taken in accordance with the BUR 	Bottoms Up Review	1999	22%
1994	Bill Clinton	YES									

Year	President	Reduction Review	By Date	% Reduction	New Base (AD Army)	New Base (AD Navy)	New Base (AD Air Force)	New Base (AD Marine)	Total AD	Total Reserve	Army AD Divs	Army Res Divs	AF AD Wings	AF res Wings	Navy ships	Navy carrier
2001	Bill Clinton															
2000	Bill Clinton															
1999	Bill Clinton															
1998	Bill Clinton															
1997	Bill Clinton	QDR - Full Spectrum Force	2003	4%	480,000	375,000	363,100	172,900	1,338,300	736,000	10	8	12	8		12
1996	Bill Clinton															
1995	Bill Clinton	Bottoms Up Review	1999	22%	495,000	394,000	390,000	174,000	1,400,000	765,000	10	5	13	7	346	12
1994	Bill Clinton															

Appendix 5 – NSS Review (2001-2009)⁶⁰

Year	President	NSS	NDS	NMS	NSS Context	NSS Objectives	NSS Defense Agenda	NSS Defense Direction	NSS Assessment
2008	George W. Bush		YES						
2007	George W. Bush								
2006	George W. Bush	YES			1. Feels and written more propaganda like 2. States democracy in the middle east versus the words used in 2002 3. More direct and US only versus 2002 was more cooperative 4. Same 6 are reviewed 5. More democratic focused	1. Terrorism 2. Extremism 3. Ensuring expanded and open markets 4. Democracy spreads	1. Very little in terms of defense and military 2. Talked extensively about terrorism and extremism 3. Referenced 2006 QDR but provided no clear direction other than the 2002 Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges		
2005	George W. Bush		YES						
2004	George W. Bush			YES					
2003	George W. Bush								
2002	George W. Bush	YES			1. New president different approach 2. Similar themes - this was published 1 year after 9/11	1. Champion aspirations for human dignity 2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends 3. Work other others to defuse regional conflicts 4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with WMD 5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade 6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building infrastructure of democracy 7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power 8. Transform Americas national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities on the 21st century - interesting #2 - all are reviewed in greater detail but #2 states - "supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation" - so what happened to pushing democracy?	1. Transformation still an issue to defend the United States	1. Assure our allies and friends 2. Dissuade future military competition 3. Deter threats against US interests, allies, and friends 4. Decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails	1. While some of the verbiage reiterates past NSS - the overall message is much more loose 2. Removal of the 2 MRCs 3. Very little direction for the military unlike previous NSS 4. This is odd because its directly after 9/11 (1 year) 5. No clear direction for military aside from - forward presence is important, intelligence is important and familiar statements about space and long range capabilities

Appendix 6 – NMS Review and Resulting Force Reductions (2001-2009)⁶¹

Year	President	NSS	NDS	NMS	NDS Direction	NMS Foundations	NMS Strategic Principles	NMS Assessment	Reduction Review	By Date
2008	George W. Bush		YES		<p>1. NDS focused on 2006 NSS two pillars (promoting freedom, justice and human dignity by working to end tyranny, promote effective democracies, and extend prosperity; confronting the challenges of out time by leading a growing community of democracies</p> <p>2. Again NSS doesn't provide the direction or info for the NDS/NMS to develop its strategy</p> <p>3. Lack of clear guidance and ends</p> <p>4. Limits nuclear direction with lack of emphasis - overshadowed by terrorism and lack of direction for conventional deterrence - does state (maintain nuclear arsenal as a primary deterrent to nuclear attack, and the New Triad remains a cornerstone of strategic deterrence)</p> <p>5. Discusses 5 objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defend the homeland - Win the long war - Promote security - Deter conflict - Win our nations wars <p>6. 1-4-2-1 is removed - no indication of scope of what prepare like previous version</p>					
2007	George W. Bush									
2006	George W. Bush	YES							QDR	2011
2005	George W. Bush		YES		<p>All discussed in the 2004 NMS - brings up new term - Active Layered Defense - just another word for utilizing the defense abroad and then close at home to defend the homeland - also protecting critical bases of operation - robust intelligence, cyber operations, SOF - all NSS and strategy documents advocate continued deterrence capability (nuclear) - created its own 1-4-2-1 concept - that is NOT in the NSS - overall appearance - the Bush 41/Clinton was a positive strategy and outlined and directed downsizing based on study and strategy - the Bush 43 was not, feels haphazard not studied and constructed based on the personalities that were there, case in point is the random nature of publishing the strategies</p>					
2004	George W. Bush			YES		<p>1. Win War on Terrorism</p> <p>2. Enhance Joint war fighting</p> <p>3. Transform for the future</p> <p>4. Protect the US against external attacks and aggression</p> <p>5. Prevent conflict and surprise attack</p> <p>6. Prevail against adversaries</p>	<p>1. Wider range of adversaries</p> <p>2. More complex and distributed battle space</p> <p>3. Technology diffusion and access</p> <p>4. Protect, prevent, prevail</p>	<p>1. No reference to specific force structure</p> <p>2. Id' d from NDS 1-4-2-1 strategy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Defend homeland (1) b. Deter in and from 4 regions (4) c. conduct two overlapping defeat campaigns (2) d. win decisively one campaign (1) <p>3. Very bad objectives - no clear direction or objective - most likely because poor NSS in 2002 no NDS</p> <p>4. Provides direction for size of the force - but that sized force and expectations are much more broad than the previous requirements</p> <p>5. Pages and pages of definition and explanation of what a NSS and NDS is and how the NMS relates</p> <p>6. Says there is a wider range of adversaries - wrong - they have always been there</p> <p>7. The NMS is written like all of this is new - previous NSS from Clinton outlined all the similar issues and challenges more succinctly and ID why the force needs to be transformed reduced as it should</p>		
2003	George W. Bush									
2002	George W. Bush	YES								

Year	President	Reduction Review	By Date	% Reduction	New Base (AD Army)	New Base (AD Navy)	New Base (AD Air Force)	New Base (AD Marine)	Total AD	Total Reserve	Army AD Divs	Army Res Div	AF AD Wings	AF res Wings	Navy ships	Navy carrier
2008	George W. Bush															
2007	George W. Bush															
2006	George W. Bush	QDR	2011	N/A	482,400	N/A	316,000 (326,000 actual)	175,000	Published without a list of major force structure components							
2005	George W. Bush															
2004	George W. Bush															
2003	George W. Bush															
2002	George W. Bush															

Appendix 7 – Overall Reduction Table

Year	President	Reduction Review	By Date	% Reduction	New Base (AD Army)	New Base (AD Navy)	New Base (AD Air Force)	New Base (AD Marine)	Total AD	Total Reserve	Army AD Divs	Army Res Divs	AF AD Wings	AF res Wings	Navy ships	Navy carrier
2006	George W. Bush	QDR - Transformation	2011	N/A	482,400	N/A	316,000 (326,000 actual)	175,000	Published without a list of major force structure components							
2001	Bill Clinton	QDR	No specifics to force reductions													
1997	Bill Clinton	QDR - Full Spectrum Force	2003	6%	480,000	375,000	363,100	172,900	1,338,300	736,000	10	8	12	8		12
1995	Bill Clinton	Bottoms Up Review	1999	22%	495,000	394,000	390,000	174,000	1,400,000	765,000	10	5	13	7	346	12
1992	George H. W. Bush	Base Force	1997	25%	535,500	509,700	437,200	170,600	1,653,000	898,000	12	8	15	11	451	12
1991	George H. W. Bush	Start after Cold War			760,000	587,000	524,989	197,000	2,100,000	1,560,000	18	10	24	12	546	15

Reduction Programs	1992 Base Force		Appendix 8 – Air Force Officer AFSC Data																									
	1993 Bottom-up Review																		2001 QDR									
					1997 QDR																							
													2006 QDR								2010 QDR							
FISCAL YEAR	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012									
OFFICER AF SPECIALTY CODE	# Assign	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#									
13A	320	329	340	315	Split (13D, 13M) 4 to attrit																							
13B - Air Battle Manager	1,524	1,345	1,363	1,203	1,087	1,069	1,044	941	920	ABM																		
13D - Combat Control					57	69	67	76	101	125	140	149	161	162	167	185	199	201	204									
13E	1,126	957	Merge 14N or 33S - 62 to attrit	11	2	2	1	1																				
13L - Air Liaison Officer																12	48	63	91									
13M - Airfield Operations					228	306	317	327	364	400	408	394	354	344	326	331	330	313	305									
13S - Space and Missile	2,874	3,801	3,595	3,683	3,575	3,296	3,571	3,417	3,258	3,161	3,353	3,507	3,450	3,303	3,198	3,308	3,213	3,044	2,984									
14N - Intelligence	2,451	2,211	2,867	2,676	2,740	2,722	2,973	2,820	2,723	3,034	3,058	3,072	3,048	2,789	2,653	2,768	2,801	2,827	2,935									
15W - Weather	922	808	812	801	749	740	754	715	702	813	780	833	771	699	650	665	627	566	552									
17D - Comm/Computer																			3,272	2,953	2,845							
21A - Aircraft Mx	2,262	2,014	2,346	2,370	2,259	2,210	2,017	1,923	1,907	1,997	2,009	2,003	1,810	1,618	1,515	1,508	1,468	1,362	1,331									
21G - Logistics Plans			712	651	598	646	665	655	698	Merge 21R - 27 to attrit	25	21																
21L - Logistician											1																	
21M - Munitions/Missile Mx			236	211	210	207	414	417	479	523	525	508	464	416	384	383	388	373	339									
21R - Logistics Readiness												2,134	2,124	2,040	1,971	1,740	1,670	1,682	1,626	1,584	1,497							
21S - Supply			710	714	692	679	664	637	656	Merge 21R - 46 to attrit	38	22																
21T - Transportation			673	705	681	670	674	665	696	Merge 21R - 41 to attrit	35	27																
22S - Space & Missile Mx	292	249	Consolidate (21G, 21M, 21S, 21T)																									
23S - Supply	783	665																										
24T - Transportation	664	709																										
25L - Logistics Plans	638	558																										
31P - Security Forces	760	665	814	846	841	841	837	830	874	1,004	981	1,068	847	743	738	762	785	764	733									
32E - Civil Engineer	1,655	1,548	1,653	1,635	1,543	1,517	1,540	1,440	1,501	1,532	1,532	1,562	1,459	1,316	1,265	1,291	1,272	1,247	1,217									
33S - Comm/Computer	4,274	4,136	4,894	4,863	4,530	4,368	4,369	4,172	4,433	4,726	4,543	4,644	4,171	3,633	3,295	3,321	Changed 17D											

Reduction Programs	1992 Base Force																							
	1993 Bottom-up Review																							
					1997 QDR							2001 QDR												
													2006 QDR							2010 QDR				
FISCAL YEAR	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012					
OFFICER AF SPECIALTY CODE	# Assign	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#					
33V - Audio Visual	79	92	Merge 33S																					
34M - Services	378	363	380	394	391	387	388	396	434	533	554	606	466	400	391	Merge 36P								
35B - Band	26	25	21	21	19	17	18	18	25	24	24	24	23	19	17	19	21	20	20					
35P - Public Affairs	345	332	406	425	407	406	398	399	434	512	522	492	401	317	298	302	300	301	298					
36E -	179	137	112	Merge 36P - 6 to attrit	3	1																		
36P - Personnel - Recorded 37F (FY 2006) Recorded 38F (FY2009) Recorded 38P (FY2012)	836	893	1,858	1,917	1,863	1,847	1,854	1,787	1,848	2,012	1,898	1,901	1,936	1,686	1,537	1,911	1,881	1,712	1,613					
36S - Social Actions	79	54	40	Merge 36P - 2 to attrit)	2	1	1	1	1															
36X - Protocol	95	88	Merge 36P or 33S Officer choice - 70 37A attrit																					
37A - Information Management	1,381	1,500		39	31	27	11	6	6	1														
38M - Manpower and Organization	336	297	312	336	330	342	358	357	368	432	417	435	Merge 37F											
61A																	491	498	500					
61B																	151	149	141					
61C																	159	132	117					
61D																	304	285	257					
61S	1,088	966	1,122	1,146	1,071	1,050	1,029	956	971	1,041	1,112	1,156	1,157	1,076	1,057	1,113	Broke out into A,B,C,D - 7 to attrit							
62E - Developmental Engineering	4,180	3,824	4,170	3,882	3,513	3,220	3,087	2,874	2,831	2,975	3,130	3,419	3,657	3,488	3,447	3,479	3,441	3,536	3,609					
63A - Acquisitions	1,755	1,560	2,032	2,008	1,994	2,052	2,088	2,071	2,243	2,654	2,565	2,661	2,329	2,124	2,026	2,148	2,154	2,234	2,240					
64P - Contracting	1,034	1,067	1,145	1,147	1,083	1,059	1,060	1,014	1,030	1,108	1,032	1,095	991	923	877	872	853	823	789					
65F - Financial Mgt	1,006	1,032	1,051	1,034	975	976	991	944	962	1,041	1,007	986	901	788	742	746	718	693	668					

Reduction Programs	1992 Base Force																								
	1993 Bottom-up Review																								
					1997 QDR								2001 QDR												
													2006 QDR		2006 QDR						2010 QDR				
													2006 QDR								2010 QDR				
FISCAL YEAR	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012						
OFFICER AF SPECIALTY CODE	# Assign	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#						
65W - Cost Analysis																6	13								
71S - Special Agent	372	326	380	371	398	374	409	402	440	451	440	415	379	374	350	391	369	366	361						
ABM (LT-LTC)										1,139	1,207	1,308	1,367	1,262	1,282	1,342	1,426	1,500	1,545						
ASTRONAUTS	22	25	28	28	26	24	25	25	24	22	19	16	16	14	11	10	9	7	5						
BSC	2,609	2,579	2,596	2,552	2,550	2,530	2,499	2,409	2,572	2,586	2,557	2,442	2,317	2,264	2,253	2,209	2,362	2,370	2,420						
CHAPLAIN	699	655	633	614	614	599	596	595	612	626	624	622	613	568	552	512	501	456	446						
DENTAL CORP	1,202	1,167	1,119	1,125	1,179	1,131	1,088	1,007	1,013	967	995	961	925	901	927	766	999	1,048	1,051						
JAG	1,317	1,306	1,310	1,311	1,318	1,312	1,310	1,270	1,347	1,361	1,341	1,326	1,276	1,260	1,260	1,196	1,227	1,219	1,206						
MEDICAL CORP	4,251	4,225	4,171	4,124	4,097	3,942	3,870	3,737	3,670	3,610	3,593	3,544	3,464	3,447	3,467	3,148	3,491	3,502	3,548						
MSC	1,388	1,380	1,363	1,331	1,335	1,308	1,264	1,224	1,264	1,330	1,407	1,395	1,346	1,288	1,258	1,181	1,304	1,284	1,227						
NAV (LT-LTC)	6,423	5,864	5,551	5,388	5,248	5,075	4,959	4,842	4,934	4,733	4,651	4,630	4,452	4,243	4,213	4,122	4,074	3,792	3,721						
NURSE CORP	4,910	4,839	4,828	4,779	4,709	4,333	4,057	3,708	3,793	3,698	3,731	3,596	3,480	3,331	3,298	3,183	3,393	3,405	3,465						
PILOT (LT-LTC)	15,958	15,352	14,759	14,164	13,443	12,677	12,261	11,883	12,627	13,177	13,735	13,752	13,647	13,063	13,241	13,487	14,082	14,541	14,408						
RATED (COL)	1,770	1,735	1,670	1,557	1,544	1,563	1,438	1,349	1,290	1,303	1,215	1,169	1,228	1,190	1,248	178									
RPA (LT-LTC)	New Breakout															16	22	113							
COL (NONLINE)	New Breakout															935	976	981	949						
COL (NONRATED LINE)	New Breakout															1,427	1,434	1,390	1,427						
COL (RATED)	New Breakout															1,307	1,274	1,180	1,199						
UFT	987	1,434	1,956	2,218	2,602	2,627	2,797	2,639	2,350	2,495	3,127	3,124	3,238	3,167	2,784	2,860	2,941	2,952	2,767						
UNK/OTHER	5,458	5,058	1,953	1,107	1,077	1,824	989	2,421	4,867	3,803	3,384	2,053	2,137	1,479	2,113	115	1,095	372	659						
RATED-DISQUAL	New Breakout															194	221	182							
TOTAL	80,708	78,170	76,113	73,710	71,618	70,046	68,752	67,371	71,268	73,197	73,838	72,979	70,252	65,436	64,512	65,181	65,886	65,170	64,628						

Notes

1. Gargan, *To Defend a Nation: An Overview of Downsizing and the U.S. Military*, 1999. “a grand strategy defines national values and interests and is implemented through a national security policy. The national security policy provides a framework for the formulation of military, economic, and political-diplomatic strategies. The national military strategy guides the strategic planning of the several services, joint operations of the services, and the strategies of regional and functional military commands.”

2. Isaacson and Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made*, 1986.

3. Troxell, “Force Planning and U.S. Defense Policy,” 2001.

4. Suri, “American Grand Strategy from the Cold Wars End to 9/11,” 2009. Complete quote and thought, “They were difficult to think about in systematic terms, ranging from rogue states to anarchical societies, with warlords and terrorists in-between.... How would the United States integrate military capabilities into plans for enlargement? Under which conditions would the nation send U.S. forces abroad? Which threats would leaders emphasize in military procurement and planning? These were all central topics of debate during the Cold War. These issues dropped off the map of policy—and academic study—in the post-Cold War world.”

5 The strategic documents from the 1990s through 2012 provide the foundational direction for reduction actions (Appendices 1-7 are summaries of NSS, NDS and NMS documents from 1991 until 2012).

6. Gargan, *To Defend a Nation: An Overview of Downsizing and the U.S. Military*, 1999. “Articulation of military strategies which, in turn, demarcate the size of force needed, requires some level of consensus on the priority status of values and interests to be protected and promoted during a given period. The military strategies and resulting force size must also consider the likelihood and severity of the nature and scope of threats during the period. Since resources are always limited and potential points of trouble are global, military forces must be tasked to deal only with significant problems.”

7. Snider, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision,” 1995.

8. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 1986, (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States. (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1). (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy. (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress

9. Title 10-Armed Forces, n.d., as defined by 10 U.S.C., Section 153. Title 10, the NMS will: “(B) A description of the strategic environment and the opportunities and challenges that affect United States national interests and United States national security. (C) A description of the regional threats to United States national interests and United States national security. (D) A description of the international threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric challenges to United States national security. (E) Identification of United States national military objectives and the relationship of those objectives to the strategic environment,

regional, and international threats. (F) Identification of the strategy, underlying concepts, and component elements that contribute to the achievement of United States national military objectives. (G) Assessment of the capabilities and adequacy of United States forces (including both active and reserve components) to successfully execute the national military strategy. (H) Assessment of the capabilities, adequacy, and interoperability of regional allies of the United States and or other friendly nations to support United States forces in combat operations and other operations for extended periods of time.”

10. Gargan, *To Defend a Nation: An Overview of Downsizing and the U.S. Military*, 1999.

11. DoD Department of Personnel and Procurement 1988-2011, *Military Personnel Statistics*, n.s., The World Bank, *Military Expenditure (% of GDP)*, n.d., all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid.

12. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), “FY2013 Budget Request Overview Book,” 2012.

13. See Appendices 1-7 for a complete review of all NSS, NDS, and NMS documents

14. Cheney, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy,” 1993.

15. Gellman, “Keeping the U.S. First,” 1992.

16. See Appendix 2 for a summary of the overall reduction numbers. It is possible to find various references and overall reduction numbers based on when the reference was written. The majority of the information contained within this paper consolidated date taken from references listed in endnote 21 and DoD Military Personnel Statistics -

<http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm>

17. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992*, 1993.

18. Lewis, *Downsizing Future USAF Fighter Forces: Living within the Constraints of History*, 1995.

19 This section will briefly review the impact to Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) (see Appendix 8).

20. See Appendices 1-7 for a complete review of all NSS, NDS, and NMS documents

21. Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” 1993.

22. Aside from the NSS summary reviews located in the Attachments, a review of Anthony Lakes speech to John Hopkins outlines the four centerpiece directives of the enlargement strategy “1. We should strengthen the community of major market democracies—including our own—which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding, 2. We should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible in states of special significance and opportunity. 3. We must counter the aggression—and support the liberalization—of states hostile to democracy and markets. 4. We need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.” (Lake 1993)

23. Tirpak, “Projections from the QDR,” 1997.

24. See Appendix 7 and 8 for summary reductions

25. RAND, “The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review: Seeking to Restore Balance,” 2001.

26. Correll, "The Legacy of the Bottoms-up Review," 2003.
27. RAND, "The Bottom-up Review: Redefining Post-Cold War Strategy and Forces," 2001.
28. Grant, "On QDRs," 2011.
29. Ibid.
30. Cordesman, "The Quadrennial Defense Review: the American Threat to the United States," 1997.
31. Correll, "In the Wake of the QDR," 2006.
- 32 See Appendix 8 for supporting data
33. Correll, "The Legacy of the Bottoms-up Review," 2003.
34. Appendix 8s RED and GREEN blocks--These blocks signify the closure of an AFSC (RED), the reason for the closure, and the opening or increase in another AFSC (GREEN) as a result of the closure.
35. Wood and Grandia, *Mission Support Squadrons: A Look into the Future*, 1989.
36. Correll, "Mixed Signals from the Quadrennial Review," 1997.
37. Cameron, "Strategies for Successful Organization Downsizing," 1994.
38. Heil, "Downsizing and Rightsizing," n.d.
39. Cameron, "Strategies for Successful Organization Downsizing," 1994.
40. See Appendices 1-7 for a complete review of all NSS, NDS, and NMS documents
41. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review," 2001.
42. Correll, "In the Wake of the QDR," 2006.
43. Ibid.
44. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review," 2001.
45. Cordesman and Frederiksen, *America's Uncertain Approach to Strategy and Force Planning*, 2006.
46. Air Force Audit Agency, "Air Force Personnel Reductions-Audit Report F2008-00040FD4000," 12 May 2008.
47. Scully, "Needed: 200 New Aircraft a Year," 2008.
48. 2008 USAF Almanac: *Structure of the Force*, 2008.
49. Scully, "Needed: 200 New Aircraft a Year," 2008.
50. Air Force Personnel Center, "38MX-Manpower," n.d. and Air Force Occupational Measurement Center, *Manpower Management (Officer and Enlisted)*, 1989.
51. Wood and Grandia, *Mission Support Squadrons: A Look into the Future*, 1989.
52. Air Force Personnel Center, "34MX-Services Field," n.d.
53. Secretary of Defense, *Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management*, 2008.
54. Grever, "AF officials reestablish squadron commander support staffs," 2012.
55. General Accounting Office, *DoD Joint Bases: Management Improvements needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies*, 2012.
56. The data contained in this table was derived from a review of multiple sources – the NSS Archives (1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2010) - <http://nssarchive.us/> - Richard M. Meinhart's review of NMS from 1990-2009 located at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/DCLM/National%20Military%20Strategies%201990%20to%202009.pdf> – The RAND Report entitled, "The Base Force: From Global Containment to Regional Forward Presence" located at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1387/MR1387.ch2.pdf -

NDS/NMS documents located at the FAS Military Analysis Network (1992, 1995, 1997, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011) located at <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/> - also at the Air University: Air War College Gateway at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-doct.htm#nms> - and Lorne S. Jaffe, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The Development of the Base Force: 1989-1992,"

<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/baseforc.pdf>

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid, with addition of John T. Correll. "Legacy of the Bottom-up Review,"

<http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2003/October%202003/1003bur.pdf> - John A.

Tirpak, "Projections from the QDR," <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/1997/August%201997/0897qdr.pdf> and Les Aspin, "Report of the Bottom-up Review," <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA359953>

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.



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